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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN A
RESCUE SITUATION*
WILLIAM T. PIZZI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that the kidnapping of a child has taken place, that the
kidnappers have contacted the child's family with a hefty ransom demand and that the kidnappers have issued the usual warning that if
there is any delay in meeting the ransom demand, they will kill the
child. Imagine further that the police apprehended one of the kidnappers when he arrived at the "drop"-the location selected for
handing over the ransom money. At this point the police are unsure
where the child is being held and obviously have good reason to fear
that the life of the child is in serious danger. How should the police
proceed in questioning the kidnapper?
Those familiar with the writings of Judge Henry Friendly may
recognize the origins of this inquiry from an article he wrote in
1965,1 just after the Court decided Escobedo v. Illinois,2 in which he
expressed concern over expansion of the right to counsel and asked
the following question:
If such a tragedy were to strike at the family of a writer who is enthused about extending the assistance of counsel clause to the station
* I want to thank my colleagues and other friends for their criticisms and
suggestions as this article took shape. In particular, I want to thank Albert Alschuler,
Richard Collins and Barry Nakell for their written comments on earlier drafts of this

paper.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D., Harvard
University, 1971; M.A., University of Massachusetts, 1971; B.A., Holy Cross College,
1965.
I Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929
(1965).
2 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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house, would he really believe the fundamental liberties of the suspect
demanded the summoning of a lawyer, or at least a clear warning as to
the right immediately to consult one, before
the police began ques3
tioning in an effort to retrieve his child?
Two years later, after the Court in Miranda v. Arizona 4 made clear
that it was the privilege against self-incrimination, not the right to
counsel, that controlled the interrogation of suspects,5 Judge
6
Friendly asked the same question in regard to Miranda.
This article examines the issues surrounding the question of the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a rescue situation. In its analysis, this article develops the implications ofJudge
Friendly's kidnapping hypothetical and uses the kidnapping hypothetical as a vehicle for examining the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HYPOTHETICAL

When Judge Friendly originally put forward the hypothetical,
one critic belittled its importance by insisting that it presented simply an "emotional dilemma" because the number of kidnappings is
"so statistically insignificant that any case is newsworthy nationwide." ' 7 Whatever the dubious merits of this criticism in the late
1960's, there are strong reasons today for looking at the kidnapping
hypothetical in greater detail. It is no secret that many citizens are
growing concerned, and even angry, about our criminal justice system. It is frequently suggested that the courts have gone too far in
expanding the rights of defendants but show no sympathy or concern for the victims of crime. 8 Public distrust even has led to the
formation of organizations that monitor judicial rulings and decisions. 9 In addition, there have been voter-initiated referenda in two
states aimed at limiting the courts' power to exclude relevant evi3

Friendly, supra note 1, at 949.

4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 The Court has made it clear that Escobedo now is to be limited to its own facts. See
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
6 H.J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 277 (1967).
7 Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?" California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 59, 119 n.319 (1966).
8 See, e.g., Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 28, 1983, at 1, col. I (report on meeting of
judges from around the country to consider recommendations to improve the judicial
system's treatment of victims); N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1983, § B, at 7, col. 3 (report of
Chairman of President's Task Force, on Victims of Crime); Royster, Thinking Things Over,
Wall St.J., Oct. 27, 1982, at 32, col. 3; Editorial, Making CriminalsPay, Wall St.J., Sept.
23, 1982, at 34, col. 1.
9 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1983, § A, at 21, col. 1.
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dence.' 0 Because the kidnapping hypothetical directly involves a
victim and some difficult police decisions, it presents an excellent
vantage point from which to examine the balance that exists or
ought to exist in the criminal justice system between the rights of
the suspect and the legitimate concern for the victim. Even though
kidnappings may be relatively few in number, what such cases say
about the value of human life and the rights of the defendant may be
much more significant in terms of public respect for the system of
criminal justice than the system's disposition of other incidents
which occur more frequently.
Aside from the perspective the hypothetical affords for examining the criminal justice system, the legal issues surrounding the kidnapping hypothetical deserve attention in their own right. While
hopefully we never will reach the stage that some countries have
reached where kidnapping is big business, t" the kidnapping hypothetical is only one of many dangerous situations in which innocent
lives are threatened. Among such situations are prison takeovers,
airline hijackings and various acts of terrorism, like planting
bombs. 12 These situations are usually highly visible and put tremendous pressure on those who must decide the best way to handle
the crisis with the minimum loss of life. No one can predict in advance the factual twists that may arise in a given situation, 13 nor is
there a single formula for resolving such crises. 14 But in a world
10 InJune, 1982, voters in California approved Proposition 8, entitled the "Victims'
Bill of Rights." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. Proposition 8 includes a provision challenging
the exclusionary rule. The relevant subsection declares in part that "relevant evidence
shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28 (d).
Florida also passed a referendum issue in 1982 designed to limit independent expansion of the state constitutional provision on search and seizure. The amendment to
the Florida Constitution provides that the search and seizure clause shall be construed
in conformity with the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12. This amendment
limits Florida's state exclusionary remedy to the parameters of the federal exclusionary
rule. See State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1983).
11 In Italy and some Latin American countries, for example, reports suggest that kidnapping has become more profitable and less likely to lead to conviction than bank robbery. R. CLUrrERBUCK, KIDNAP AND RANSOM: THE RESPONSE 21 (1978).
12 The randomness of political terrorism and the realization that terrorism is possible
in any setting make terrorism more frightening to a society than the more numerous
homicides committed for money or revenge. See id.
13 In United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975), for example, prisoners in the District of Columbia jail, who had taken hostages, marched boldly into federal
court holding the jail's director a hostage at gunpoint to obtain a "hearing" before a
federal district judge on their demands.
14 Research has shown that
[t]here is no blueprint for dealing with a "Type A" or "Type B" hostage situation.
All sorts of variables, game rule changes, supervisory twists, and plain fate come
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where major police departments have found it necessary to form
hostage negotiation teams 5 and where extraordinary precautions
against terrorism have become-a necessary part of planning major
sporting events, 16 it would seem that, at a minimum, we should understand the relevant constitutional questions.
Unfortunately, cases similar to the kidnapping hypothetical do
occur. One recent example is a New York case, People v. Krom. 17 In
Krom, a masked gunman tied up the husband of the victim and kidnapped the man's wife. The kidnapper called the victim's father
later the same day and demanded a million dollars ransom.' 8 The
following evening he called the father's home again, but this time
the victim's husband answered the phone and recognized the kidnapper's voice as someone he had known for several years. 19 The
caller immediately hung up.
The police went to the home of the suspect the next day. In the
garage the police observed a sports car that seemed to fit the description of a car seen in the victim's neighborhood on the night of
the kidnapping. 20 When the suspect came out of his house, the police told him they believed he might have some information that
would help them find the victim. The police told the suspect the
results of the investigation up to that point and also gave him the
Miranda warnings. 2 ' The suspect said that he might be able to help,
22
but he insisted on being paid $400,000 for his information.
Although he was not yet under arrest, the police then asked the suspect to come to the station house.
At the station, the suspect continued to demand large sums of
money for his information and asked to see the victim's wealthy father so that arrangements for payment could be made. He insisted
into play. The negotiator must be able to survive for periods without structure or
precedent. He must have confidence in his skills and decisions.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTIONS INFORMATION SERIES: PRISON HosTAGE SITUATIONS at 11 (1983).
15 See A.H. MILLER, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS 17-18 (1980).

16 When Los Angeles hosted the Olympic Games, there was a security force of

17,000 to protect the athletes. Local police officials were equipped with a full arsenal of
anti-terrorist equipment, including a robot that could be used to defuse bombs. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 3. A 50-agent F.B.I. "hostage-rescue team" also was
among the security force. Penn, New Terrorist Groups Are Appearingin U.S., Resembling Old
Ones, Wall St. J., July 26, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
17 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1984). For a discussion of the
court's decision in Krom, see infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
18 Id. at 192, 461 N.E.2d at 277-78, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 140-41.
19 Id. at 193, 461 N.E.2d at 278, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22

Id.
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the victim was safe. 2 3 At one point, the suspect even drew up agreements to be signed by the victim's father and the police promising
him money and immunity for his information. When the police said
that they could not sign such an agreement, the suspect started to
leave the station house. 24 At that point, the police arrested the suspect. 2 5 The suspect then asked for an attorney.2 6 The suspect was
permitted to call a private attorney who had represented his family
on another occasion. Discussions ceased in order to permit counsel
27
to come to the station.
When counsel arrived, the suspect told him that he would not
be paid unless he (the suspect) obtained some of the ransom money.
The attorney responded that he would not represent the suspect
and left, telling the suspect to call the public defender. 28 The police
asked the suspect if he wanted them to reach the public defender. 29
The suspect replied that he would represent himself and repeated
his request to meet with the victim's father.3 0 Finally, the victim's
father came to the station house to meet with the suspect. The father agreed to pay Krom's attorney's fees, to finance his bail and to
provide $10,000 for "expenses." 3 1 The suspect then led the police
to a wooded area where the victim had been placed in a coffin-like
box in a shallow hole in the ground. When the police opened the
32
box, they found that the victim had suffocated.
Should the police have acted more decisively in Krom? That is a
difficult question to answer based on only an appellate opinion, and
it may be that no action by the police would have made a difference
to the victim's life in that case. The point of detailing the facts of
Krom is not to second-guess the police, but rather to emphasize the
importance of the relevant constitutional considerations. It is crucial that, at a minimum, police understand exactly how the Constitution bears on their conduct when they face a life-threatening
situation. A terrible tragedy could occur if the police hesitate to act
because of a mistaken belief or even uncertainty about the demands
of the Constitution in such a situation.
Id.
Id.
25 Id. at 194, 461 N.E.2d at 278, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id., 461 N.E.2d at 279, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3 Id.
32 Id. at 195, 461 N.E.2d at 279, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
23

24
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MIRANDA IN A CRISIS SITUATION

THE ORIGINS OF MIRANDA

The first problem facing the police in the kidnapping hypothetical is whether they are required to administer Miranda warnings to
the kidnapper who is clearly in their custody and from whom they
want to learn the victim's whereabouts. Until relatively recently in
our constitutional history, the privilege against self-incrimination
did not cover police questioning of suspects. Instead, the due process clause and the prohibition against the use at trial of involuntary
confessions controlled the conduct of the police in the station
house. 33 In 1964, however, the problem of involuntary confessions
was considered in connection with the privilege against self-incrimination. In Malloy v. Hogan,34 the Court announced that "the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will ... ." Moreover, in

1966 in Miranda v. Arizona,35 the Court firmly established the control
of the privilege over police interrogation of suspects.
It had been obvious in the years prior to Miranda that the Court
was looking for a broader solution to the problem of custodial interrogation than that provided by the voluntariness doctrine. The confessions area was difficult for the Court to police because there is
limited review of trial court findings 36 and because the number of
cases the Court could take was necessarily only a small percentage
of the cases raising a confession issue. 3 7 Moreover, the Court appeared to want a test that focused less on the suspect and more on
the police conduct.
In Miranda, the Court specifically conceded that the confessions
in the four consolidated cases before it might be voluntary in traditional terms. 38 The Court, however, was concerned with modern
33 See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 OHIo ST. L.J.
449, 462-67 (1964).
34 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
35 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36 It has been suggested that the Court has been concerned that even when trial
court decisions are formally beyond reproach, the decisions may be wrong. See Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671,
710 (1968).
37 Between 1936, when the Court decided Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
and 1964, the Court decided only 37 coerced confession cases. See Herman, supra note
33, at 457 n.49; Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI.
L. REv. 313 n.1 (1964).
38 384 U.S. at 457.
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psychological interrogation techniques that were very effective in
pressuring suspects to make incriminating statements and that made
physical coercion unnecessary. Much of the majority opinion is devoted to a review of techniques in police training manuals that are
designed to "keep the subject off balance" in order to "persuade,
39
trick or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights."
Among the techniques of which the Court was critical were: (1) the
tactic of encouraging a suspect to talk by minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense or casting blame on the victim; 40 (2) the
"Mutt and Jeff" technique where one officer plays the role of the
angry, relentless investigator who is very threatening in his demeanor, while the other officer plays the role of the gentle, kindhearted, understanding officer who, after the threatening officer
leaves the room, encourages the suspect to open up to him; 4 1 and
(3) the use of outright deception, such as when a suspect is frightened into confessing by the fact that he has been picked out of a
lineup by a fictitious "witness to the crime" who has been coached
42
to select him.
Consistent with its criticism of police tactics, the Court concluded.that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards sufficient to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. 4 3 The opinion then outlined the famous
warnings that, in the absence of other fully effective safeguards,
44
must be given to a suspect in custody prior to interrogation.
B.

MIRANDA IN A RESCUE SITUATION:

CONFUSION IN THE COURTS

The four cases that were consolidated in Miranda all involved
purely investigative questioning by the police.4 5 Although the investigation of crimes and the enforcement of the criminal laws may
39 Id. at 455.

40 Id. at 450.
41 Id. at 452.
42 Id. at 453.
43 Id. at 467.

44 The warnings that must be given are that the suspect has a right to remain silent,
that anything he says may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
to represent him. Id. at 467-79.
45 Miranda v. Arizona involved custodial questioning concerning a rape and kidnapping incident, id. at 491-92; Vignera v. New York involved custodial questioning concerning a robbery three days earlier, id. at 493-94; Westover v. United States involved custodial
interrogation concerning two prior robberies, id. at 494-95; and California v. Stewart involved custodial interrogation concerning a series of purse-snatch robberies where, in
one case, the victim died of the injuries sustained, id. at 497-98.
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be the police functions most visible for the courts, they are only two
of many important responsibilities that police carry out, and those
tasks occupy only a minority of an officer's time.4 6 Another important police duty is the task sometimes referred to as "crisis intervention" 4 7 or "peacekeeping.- 48 This duty has been described as "a
broad and most important mandate which involves the protection of
lives and rights ranging from handling street corner brawls to the
settlement of violent family disputes. In a word, it means maintain49
ing public safety."
When the focus of a police inquiry shifts from investigative
questioning to questioning that has as its primary objective saving
lives, the courts have been struggling to understand how to apply
the broad language of Miranda. Two of the cases that evidence this
struggle are United States v. Mesa 50 and People v. Dean.5 1
In United States v. Mesa, the FBI surrounded a motel room in
which Mesa had barricaded himself. Mesa was believed to be
armed, possibly suicidal and possibly holding hostages. 52 For over
three and a half hours, an agent specially trained in hostage negotiation techniques tried to defuse the situation. Among the techniques
used by the agent to gain Mesa's confidence was an effort to portray
himself as Mesa's friend. 53 The conversation between Mesa and the
agent covered many personal matters including the circumstances
of a shooting that Mesa had committed the previous day. 54 Finally,
Mesa surrendered and then was given Miranda warnings. 5 5
Prior to his trial for the shootings, Mesa sought to have the in46 Estimates of the amount of an officer's time actually devoted to investigating and
arresting criminals range from as little as 10%, see Martin, Police and Crisis Intervention, in
VANCE BIBLIOGRAPHIES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SERIES:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

P 410 at 2

(1980), up to about 30% of an officer's time, see Misner, Enforcement: The Illusion of Security, 208 NATION 488 (1969). See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION 32-37 (Tent. Draft 1972).
47 Martin, supra note 46, at 2.
48 See J.S. CAMPBELL, J.R. SAHID & D.P. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
OF THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 286 (1969).
49 Id.
50 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980).

51 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974).
52 638 F.2d at 583.
53 The agent tried to be supportive of Mesa. For example, the agent said "I'm concerned about you Rigoberto, I'm concerned about your welfare, and I'm concerned
about your health and I want to make absolutely certain that you and I trust each other
and we can bring this problem to a successful solution." Id. at 584. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that this statement was "representative" of the conversation designed to keep Mesa talking and build trust between the agent and Mesa. Id.
54 Id. at 583-84.
55 Id. at 584.
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criminating statements he made to the agent regarding the shootings, which had been recorded, suppressed on the ground that the
agent failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to initiating their
discussion. 56 The district court suppressed the statements, concluding that the defendant had been interrogated while in custody and
thus the requirement that Miranda warnings be given had been violated.5 7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
suppression order, but the three judges went three different ways in
their reasoning. One judge concluded that the defendant, although
he had been surrounded by between twenty-five and thirty law enforcement officers, had not been in custody for purposes of Miranda
when the statement was given; therefore, Mirandawarnings had not
been required. 5 8 Another judge concluded that Mesa had not been
interrogated within the meaning of Miranda because the questions
were asked for primarily noninvestigative reasons; thus, he felt it unnecessary to address "the difficult issue" of whether Mesa had been
in custody. 59 Finally, a dissenting judge agreed with the district
court that Miranda had been violated because Mesa had been in custody and had been interrogated without the required warnings in a
seige atmosphere "replete with the very same dangers to Mesa's
Fifth Amendment rights as are present in a station house custody
60
situation."
It is interesting to apply the line drawn in the Mesa decision to
the kidnapping hypothetical. If Mesa had been in custody and the
case had involved a buried victim or one left in a room with a bomb,
a majority of the court would have concluded that the failure to give
Miranda warnings rendered the suspect's statements inadmissible at
his trial.
A second example of the problem courts have had applying Miranda in a life-threatening situation is People v. Dean,6 ' a case which is
one of a line of California cases that have fashioned a "rescue exception" to the requirement of Miranda warnings. 6 2 In Dean, a case with
a strong resemblance to the kidnapping hypothetical, the police disarmed and arrested a kidnapping suspect. The suspect then was
56

Id.

57 487 F. Supp. 562 (D.NJ.), rev'd, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
58 638 F.2d at 586-89 (3d Cir. 1980) (ChiefJustice Seitz wrote the opinion for the
court).
59 Id. at 589-91 (Adams, J., concurring).
60 Id- at 591, 594 (Weiner, D.J., dissenting).
61 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Gal. Rptr. 555 (1974).
62 See also People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753,42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965);
People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
937 (1979).
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asked questions about the victim's health and whereabouts without
having been given Miranda warnings. 63 At the time of the questioning, the officer did not know if the victim was dead or alive or even
how many kidnappers were involved. The defendant gave incrimi64
nating answers that led officials to the body of the victim.

While Miranda on its face would seem to have required the
supression of the statements that Dean gave the police because
Dean was in custody when he was questioned, the California Court
of Appeals concluded that Miranda was inapplicable because
"[w]hile life hangs in the balance, there is no room to require admonitions concerning the right to counsel and to remain silent. It is
inconceivable that the Miranda court or the framers of the Constitution envisioned such admonishments first be given under the facts
65
presented to us." 5

C.

NEW YORK v. QUARLES: THE "PUBLIC SAFETY"
EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA

At the end of its 1983 term, the Supreme Court decided New
York v. Quarles,6 6 a case that sheds light on the issues raised in Mesa
and Dean. By creating a public safety exception to the requirement
of Miranda warnings in Quarles, the Court's opinion is consistent
with the conclusion of the California court in Dean that Miranda
warnings are not needed when life is at stake. The Court's conclusion in Quarles also would have obviated the struggle in Mesa over
the issues of custody and interrogation in a standoff situation.
In Quarles, shortly after midnight a young woman approached a
police car in which two officers were patrolling and told them that
she just had been raped. She described the offender and told the
officers that he had entered a nearby grocery store and that he was
carrying a gun. 6 7 Police went to the store, and when they began to

approach Quarles, who fit the description that the woman had
given, the suspect ran to the back of the store. Quarles was out of
sight momentarily, but the officers then surrounded and arrested
him. 6 8 The police frisked Quarles and found an empty shoulder
holster but no gun. After he had been handcuffed, one of the po63 When asked at the suppression hearing why he had failed to give warnings to
Dean, the officer replied that he "was only concerned with the girl's safety and her
whereabouts and it really never entered [my] mind." 39 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 114 Cal.
Rptr. at 561.
64 Id. at 879, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
65 Id. at 882, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
66 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
67 Id. at 2629.
68 Id. at 2629-30.
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lice, Officer Frank Kraft, asked Quarles where the gun was. 69
Quarles nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and said,
"the gun is over there." 70 Police retrieved a loaded .38 caliber revolver from one of the cartons. Quarles then was read his Miranda
warnings. 7 1 He waived his rights and, responding to the officer's
questioning, admitted that the gun was his and that he had
72
purchased it in Florida.
The trial court, at Quarles' trial for criminal possession of a
weapon, 73 suppressed the gun and the statement "the gun is over
there" as fruits of a Miranda violation.7 4 The trial court also suppressed Quarles' statement admitting ownership of the gun because
the prior Miranda violation had tainted that evidence. 75 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling by a 4-3 vote
in an opinion that refused to recognize an exigency exception to the
requirement of Miranda warnings because the court found no indication from the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing that
his motive was to protect his own safety or the safety of the public. 7 6
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the facts presented a
"public safety" exception to the requirement that Mirandawarnings
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence
and that the availability of the exception does not turn on the subjective motives of the individual officers involved. The Court reasoned that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."'7 7 While acknowledging that by its decision "to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of [the Miranda] rule,"7 8 the
majority emphasized that police have" 'only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront,'"79 and this
exception "lessens the necessity for that on-the-scene
Id. at 2630.
Id
71 Id
72 Id
73 The Supreme Court opinion states that the record does not indicate why the state
failed to prosecute the rape charge. Id n.2.
74 Id. at 2629-30.
75 Id at 2630.
76 People v. Quarls, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
77 104 S.Ct. at 2633.
78 Id.
79 Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)).
69
70
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balancing.... "80

The majority admitted that Miranda was meant to reduce the
likelihood that "suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the station house," 81 but it concluded that the
"judicially imposed strictures of Miranda"8 2 could be relaxed to ensure public safety. The Court reminded the dissenters that Quarles
was still free to argue "that his statement was coerced under tradi83
tional due process standards" on remand.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Stevens and
Brennan, first attacked the majority's factual assumption that there
had been a concern for public safety when the officer asked Quarles
where the gun was.84 Marshall pointed out that the lower courts
found nothing to suggest that the officers were motivated by a concern for public or personal safety. Although the store was open at
the time of this incident, there were apparently no customers in the
store, and the only employees present were the clerks at the checkout counter. Thus, the relevant area easily could have been
cordoned off to search for the gun that was obviously nearby.
On the legal merits, Justice Marshall argued that the majority in
effect had approved the use of coercion.8 5 He stressed that the
whole rationale of Miranda was to combat the inherent pressures
that custody brings to bear on suspects in the physical control of the
police and that now the Court was allowing such pressure to be exploited.8 6 Marshall also predicted that the exception would prove
unworkable and that in exchange for abandoning "the rule that
brought eighteen years of doctrinal tranquility to the field of custodial interrogations, ' 8 7 police would have to suffer "through the
frustrations of another period of constitutional uncertainty" 8 8 as
courts worked out the parameters of the new "public safety"
exception.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the other three dissenters that
Quarles' statement should have been suppressed because of the Miranda violation.8 9 O'Connor argued that the exception "unnecessa104 S. Ct. at 2633.
Id. at 2632.
Id. at 2630 n.3.
Id. at 2631 n.5.
Id. at 2641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
Id. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
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rily blurs the edges of the clear line heretofore established and
makes Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand." 9 0
Nevertheless, O'Connor would have permitted the gun to be used
against Quarles because she found that "nothing in Miranda or the
privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial interrogation...."91
Quarles presents a rather weak fact situation for a public safety
exception as compared to cases like Mesa and Dean where there
could be no dispute about the officers' concern for the safety of
others. The Court's conclusion in Quarles that public safety was
threatened because "an accomplice might make use of [the gun]" or
"a customer or employee might later come upon it"92 seems rather
speculative. The rape victim's careful description of the rapist certainly implied that there was but one perpetrator, and the fact that a
citizen might find the gun, although no citizens appeared to be in
the vicinity of the arrest, hardly turns it into a bomb.
On the other hand, there is something troubling about requiring an officer to stop and give warnings to an arrested suspect at a
time when the officer's concern is focused in part on the weapon
that remains missing. Even though the suspect is under arrest, until
the nearby gun has been found the situation is not completely stabilized. While the opinion appears a bit overdramatic in suggesting
the dangers in this particular situation, the opinion is important recognition of the fact that the arrest of the suspect does not necessarily mark the end of a criminal episode from the police's perspective.
To the extent that the police's concerns about maintaining public
safety now are to be considered in deciding the point at which Miranda warnings must be given, this decision shows a welcome sensi90 Id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor believed that the admissibility of Quarles' statements made after the gun had
been found and after Miranda warnings had been given admitting that he purchased and
owned the gun should turn solely on whether the trial court found Quarles' statements
to be voluntary. Justice O'Connor nevertheless admitted that the issue of whether the
failure to give Mirandawarnings can "taint" subsequent admissions is still an open question for the Court. Id. n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Since the Quarles decision, the Court has decided the "open question" mentioned
by Justice O'Connor in that case. In Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), the
Court, in an opinion written by justice O'Connor, ruled that where a statement has been
obtained from an arrestee after proper Miranda warnings, the privilege does not require
suppression of such statement solely because there was an earlier voluntary statement
obtained without having been preceded by Miranda warnings. While the holding of Elstad is limited to a second statement situation, the language and reasoning in the opinion
is broadly phrased in terms of "fruits" and thus might be read to permit the use at trial
of any fruits of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda. Id at 1293-93.
92 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
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tivity to the police task. It would have been a stronger and clearer
opinion, however, if the Court had downplayed its emphasis on this
particular situation as one of threatened danger demanding "spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual" 9 3 and instead
based its conclusion firmly on what a police manual should tell its
officers about public safety: in a situation involving the arrest of a
suspect known to be armed, make sure the situation is completely
under control, and that includes taking control of the gun, before worrying about interrogation safeguards.
D.

APPLYING THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION

Unfortunately, the test that officers and courts are supposed to
apply after Quarles is a strange one. The Court in Quarks stressed
that Miranda need not be applied "with all its rigor to a situation in
which police officers ask questions reasonablyprompted by a concernfor
public safety. ' 94 The relevant test, however, does not ask if the questions were "reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety."
Instead, the Court emphasized that the subjective motivation of the
officer is not a factor, and courts are to decide whether the particular "exigency" justified the questions, independent of the officer's
intent.
This objective approach, which is supposed to be sympathetic
to what the police are trying to do but at the same time ignores the
justification for their actions, is another example of the Court's
strange fascination with objective-sounding tests that are designed
to avoid the need to consider the officer's intent or motive. The
Court in Rhode Island v. Innis also followed an objective approach. 9 5
In that case, the defendant, who had been arrested for a shotgun
killing of a taxi driver, had been given Miranda warnings and had
asked for an attorney at the scene of the crime. 96 On the way to the
station, within hearing of the suspect in the police car, one officer
said to the other that there was a school for handicapped children
nearby and expressed concern that one of the children might find
the missing gun and hurt himself.9 7 At that point, the suspect inter98
rupted the officers' conversation and led the officers to the gun.
The issue in that case was whether there had been "interrogation"
in violation of Miranda.
93 Id.

94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
96 Id. at 293-94.
97 Id. at 294-95.
98 Id. at 295.
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The Court in Innis announced an "objective" test, independent
of the intent of the officers, for determining whether "interrogation" had taken place for purposes of Miranda.99 According to the
Court in Innis, interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes not
just express questioning, but also "any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." 10 0 Intent is not a part of
the test; instead, a court should consider only whether the police
should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response. 10 Based on the facts
before it and its new objective test, the Court in Innis concluded that
although the officers' comments obviously had "struck a responsive
chord"'1 2 with Innis, the officers did not know that their comments
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The record revealed no evidence that the officers were aware that Innis was
"peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the
10 3
safety of handicapped children."'
The test in Innis is a maverick. Consider the case itself: does
the Court in Innis really mean that it would reach the same result
even if the officers had decided before getting into the car to drive
to the station to try the old "handicapped child" routine in an effort
to break down the defendant and obtain the incriminating weapon?
Is conduct that clearly is intended to get a response from the arrestee permissible as long as it does not rise to the level of being "rea10 4
sonably likely" to succeed in eliciting an incriminating response?
99

The Innis test, despite its emphasis on objective factors, has an interesting subjec-

tive component - the background of the defendant. Because the background of the
particular defendant is considered in applying the "reasonably likely to elicit" test, what
constitutes interrogation could vary from case to case even though the conduct and motives of the police are identical. In dealing with a particularly "hard boiled" defendant,
for example, there may be more leeway in what police can try in an effort to get a
response.
100 Id at 301.
101 In a footnote, however, the Court noted that intent is relevant as a barometer of

whether the police should have known that their conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Id at 301-02 n.7. The Court found that if the police practice "is
designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to
have that effect." Id. But see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
102 446 U.S. at 303.
103 Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added).
104 Recently, the New York courts have struggled with the issue of whether it was
interrogation under Innis when a detective placed stolen property that had been recov-

ered from an employee of the arresteejust outside the cell of a burglary-murder suspect
who then asked to speak to police and admitted his guilt. See People v. Ferro, 92 A.D.2d
298, 460 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 472 N.E.2d 13, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237
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The other side of ignoring intent is presented by the situation
where a police officer takes measures in the presence of the suspect
clearly aimed at the safety of others which happen to meet the "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" test. Is it now interrogation where an officer warns other officers of the possible
presence of a gun and that warning also happens to cause the suspect in custody to give an incriminating response? 105 Not surprisingly, even after Innis, courts continue to emphasize heavily the
officer's motive in deciding whether interrogation has taken place in
06
violation of Miranda.1
As in Innis, the Court in Quarks maintained that lower courts
should use an objective test, independent of the subjective motivations of the officers, to determine whether a public safety exception
exists. But when the majority opinion in Quarles is examined closely,
despite what the Court said about the irrelevance of subjective motivation, the opinion certainly assumes throughout that Officer Kraft
was motivated by public safety concerns. The Court stressed that
"Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question ... to insure that
further danger to the public did not result. . .. -107 In reply to the
dissenters' argument that the distinction being drawn is unworkable, the majority pointed out that "[t]he facts of this case clearly
demonstrate ... an officer's ability to recognize it. ' ' 108 Moreover,
the thrust of the majority opinion, which expressed complete confidence in officers' ability to "distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety . . .and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect,"' 10 9
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985). What is interesting about the struggle is that
it really should have been an easy issue because the detective involved admitted from the
start that he placed the furs in sight of the suspect specifically to get the arrestee to tell
what had happened. 92 A.D.2d at 302, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
105 In United States v. Bennett, 626 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1092 (1981), an officer shouted a warning to other officers that the arrested suspect had
a gun. That warning prompted an incriminating response from the arrestee. When the
defendant argued on appeal that the warning amounted to interrogation under the Innis
standard, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that it would be absurd to
require an officer concerned with the safety of other officers to have to assure the suspect at the same time that his warning was not part of an interrogation. Id. at 1312.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 145 (8th Cir. 1980); Howard v.
United States, 452 A.2d 966, 968 (D.C. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 (1983);
State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462, 466 (1983); People v. Bryant, 87 A.D. 2d
873, 874-75, 449 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1982), afd, 59 N.Y.2d 786, 451 N.E.2d 476, 464
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1983); State v. Guayante, 63 Or. App. 212, 217-18, 663 P.2d 784, 787
(1983).
107 104 S.Ct. at 2633.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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certainly seemed to imply both that the distinction was drawn properly in this case and that the purpose for which such questions are
asked should be of some importance in deciding whether public
safety justified the questions.
The Court's rationale for avoiding an inquiry into the intent of
the officer is contained in its assertion that most police officers in
Officer Kraft's position "would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives." ' 10 Motives may be "unverifiable" in the sense that there is no simple litmus test for determining
the reasons for action, but just as the heart of criminal law is a question of intent, in determining whether an officer has violated the
Constitution, the logical starting point must be an understanding of
what the officer was trying to do. To try to erect a public safety
exception to Miranda that works independently of a genuine concern for public safety on the part of the officer is awkward at best.
The fact that there may have been more than one motive behind the action of the officer in Quarles is not surprising because the
police perform multiple tasks in our society,"' 1 and most of human
behavior, legal and illegal, springs from multiple motives. But as
long as the officer believed that his actions were immediately necessary to ensure public safety' 12 and as long as the officer's conduct
and belief were reasonable, that ought to be the central consideration in the application of a public safety exception, whether or not
there were other objectives that the officer was trying to achieve at
the same time. A good analogy to police action in an emergency
situation is self-defense, where there is no requirement that the ac3 One sustor's sole motive in employing force be self-protection. 13
110 Id. at 2632.
111 See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION § 1.1 at 7 (Tent. Draft
1972).
112 On the facts as explained in the opinion, including the fact that Miranda warnings
were given immediately after the gun was located, it appears that the officer who asked
about the gun was acting out of a general concern for public safety. The opinion suggests that the concern for public safety mandates that the police quickly secure a loaded
gun that is loose in a public place. Obviously, the lower courts were using a different
standard in concluding that there was no subjective motivation to protect public safety
and appear to have been requiring an actual subjective apprehension of imminent injury
to self or others. See 58 N.Y.2d at 666, 444 N.E. 2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521. This
seems too narrow a concept of public safety.
113 The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code noted that
while the actor must believe in the necessity of his defensive action for the purpose
of his own protection.., the draft does not demand that this be the sole motive of
his actions. The existence of other motives does not detract from the reason why
the privilege is granted. Moreover, an inquiry into dominant and secondary purposes would inevitably be far too complex.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 comments at 17 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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pects that for all the talk in Quarles about the irrelevance of the
motive of the police officer, when lower courts decide which cases
fall within the public safety exception, as has proved true in applying
Innis, what the officer was trying to do usually will be the determin14
ing factor.'
E.

QUARLES AND THE KIDNAPPING HYPOTHETICAL

Quarles seems to resolve the question of the need for Miranda
warnings in the kidnapping hypothetical. If the possible, but very
unlikely, risk that a loaded but discarded gun threatens public safety
is sufficient to permit some questioning without warnings, it would
seem that the equally serious and much more likely threat of harm
to a kidnapping victim also would permit a public safety exception
to Miranda. This matter, however, is not as clear as it might be because the opinion in Quarks sometimes seems to be directed only to
a fast-developing, "on-the-scene" situation. Thus, it is possible that
the public safety exception outlined in Quarles may not apply to the
kidnapping hypothetical where questioning might take place at the
station house many hours after the abduction. Is the kidnapping
hypothetical (or a hostage negotiation or a prison takeover) a situation requiring "spontaneity rather than adherence to a police
manual?"
Even assuming that Quarles resolves the issue of the need for
warnings, where do the police go from there? In Quarles, the suspect
spoke right up and indicated the location of the gun. But what if the
kidnapper seemed more reluctant? Would it be wrong for the police to beg or plead with the kidnapper for the information, perhaps
by making an impassioned plea to return the child to those who love
him or her? Would it be improper for the police to try to scare the
kidnapper into revealing the victim's whereabouts by explaining
how capital punishment works in their jurisdiction? Could the police use some of the pressure tactics mentioned in Miranda? Perhaps, for example, the police could indicate sympathy with the
kidnapper and suggest that the victim's wealthy parents may have
deserved to have their child kidnapped. Or perhaps the police
could bluff the kidnapper into revealing the whereabouts of the victim by falsely suggesting that they have more knowledge about the
crime than they actually have. Does the Court's statement in Quarles
mentioning that Miranda was concerned with "constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation" ' 1 5 suggest that such
114

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

115 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
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techniques are always wrong, no matter what the police are trying to
6
do?"
Consider the next problem: what happens if the kidnapper tells
the police officer that he wants to say nothing. In Miranda, the
Court specifically said that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease." ' "1 7 In Michigan v. Mosley, 118 however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a confession taken from a suspect by a detective who had questioned Mosley
about a murder in an interrogation session that took place two
hours after Mosley had refused to answer questions about the robbery for which he was in jail. The second detective had been completely unaware of the earlier interrogation session. The Court
ruled that Mosley's "right to cut off questioning" had been
respected fully on these facts and distinguished the case before it
from a situation "where the police failed to honor a decision of a
person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated
efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his
mind.""t 9
Must the police back off immediately in the kidnapping hypothetical, or is there to be a public safety exception to the requirement that the police cut off questioning if so requested by the
suspect in custody? Standard hostage negotiation strategy emphasizes the need to keep talking with those holding the hostages in
order to build a good working relationship. 120 Should the fact that
the kidnapper is in custody make any difference where the police
objective of rescuing the victim remains the same?
Finally, what if the kidnapper demands to see an attorney? In
116 Whether the interrogation techniques outlined in Miranda remain proper after
warnings are given is a matter of debate. While a subsequent edition of the manual
referred to by the Court in Miranda suggests that these techniques still are permissible
after warnings are given, see J. REID & F. INBAU, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967), it has been argued that many of the techniques mentioned by the
Court should be regarded as "impermissible per se," White, Police Trickeiy in Inducing
Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 601 (1979).
117 384 U.S. at 473-74.
118 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
119 Id. at 105-06. Where the defendant was questioned again on the same offense
after having initially refused to answer questions, courts have not hesitated to rule the
subsequent statements inadmissible on the authority of Mosley. See, e.g, United States v.
Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1368 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Clayton, 407 F. Supp.
204, 206 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
120 See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTION INFORMATION SERIES:
PRISON HOSTAGE SITUATION

(1979).

6 (1983); M.

MIRON

& A.

GOLDSTEIN, HOSTAGE

95-97
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Edwards v. Arizona, 121 the Court ruled that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel he "is not subject to further interrogation
...until counsel has been made available to him, unless [he] himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police." Must all questioning now cease until a lawyer is present
to help protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination?
Would it be wrong for the police to plead with the kidnapper to
change his mind about talking with a lawyer and to help them find
its
the victim?' 22 Or is there now to be an Edwards exception to take
12 3
Quarles?
in
fashioned
exception
Miranda
the
side
place along
Quarks is an ad hoc solution to the issue of Miranda warnings
only. While any exception to Miranda is bound to be controversial,
Quarles is a timid opinion in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination. The thrust of the Quarles opinion is that the Court can
relax the "judicially imposed strictures of Miranda,"' 24 but that is as
far as it can go. To the extent that the Quarles opinion suggests that
the Court is willing to bend the requirement of Miranda warnings in
a public safety situation, but that the other rules relevant to investigative interrogations, such as the right to cut off questioning, the
right to have counsel present and limitations on interrogation tactics, apply even in a situation like the kidnapping hypothetical, the
opinion is troubling because such safeguards could, in some situations, reduce the likelihood that the victim will be rescued safely.
IV.
A.

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

ONE SOLUTION:

SPLIT THE BABY

One of the merits of the kidnapping hypothetical is that its clash
with the rules surrounding routine custodial interrogation is so pervasive that it leaves no alternative but to move beyond the rules and
their exceptions and to look again at the origin of those rules: the
privilege aginst self-incrimination. Before considering the privilege,
however, one disposition to the controversy surrounding the rescue
situation or other such life-threatening crises should be considered.
It is the argument that the dilemma presented between protecting
121 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
122 This question does not dispute that there are some situations where providing a
lawyer (or a priest or a social worker) may be a sound tactic to help convince the kidnapper to disclose the victim's location, but that consideration is separate from the question
of whether a lawyer constitutionally is required where it appears to the police that the
presence of a lawyer would not be a good strategic move.
123 New York has fashioned an exception to its state right to counsel rules to handle
the kidnapping situation. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
124 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3.
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the life of the victim and the fifth amendment rights of the defendant is really a false dilemma because there is no such conflict.
In his dissent in Quarles, for example, Justice Marshall argued
that:
...the public's safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging the Fifth Amendment. If a bomb is about to explode or the public
is otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights ....

If

trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the police may trick a
suspect into confessing ....

All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the

1 25
introduction of coerced statements at trial.
This is exactly the approach that critics have used to attack the rescue exception to Miranda that was developed by the California
courts and employed in Dean.1 26 In an influential article on Miranda,
Professor Kenneth Graham argued that in the rescue situation

• . .the conflict is not between the victim's life and the defendant's

constitutional rights, but rather between the interest of the state in
prosecuting the defendant and his constitutional rights. This is so because the police may in fact acquire the lifesaving information so long
as they do not attempt to use it to prosecute the defendant.
If the conflict is stated in this way, then the resolution seems implicit in the very principle of constitutional safeguards in criminal trials
- the interest of the state in prosecution of crime must give way to the
12 7
rights of the defendant.
Notice that Justice Marshall and Professor Graham are completely comfortable with the assumption that the constitutional
rights of the defendant are defined independently of the victim's
life. While most citizens at least would be puzzled and perhaps even
outraged at the notion that the privilege against self-incrimination
and its attendant rules come into play when the police are asking
questions of a kidnapper aimed at saving the life of the victim,
neitherJustice Marshall nor Professor Graham suggest that this consideration is unusual. Indeed, Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he
policies underlying the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination are not diminished simply because testimony is com128
pelled to protect the public's safety."'
This approach to the Constitution and the privilege treats the
victim very badly. By placing sound and reasonable measures aimed
at saving the life of the victim in conflict with what should be a concurrent police objective, enforcement of the criminal law, the vic125
126
127
128

Id. at 2648 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
For a discussion of Dean, see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.

Graham, supra note 7, at 120.
104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
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tim's life now turns on a choice that an officer will have to make
between pressing forward in an effort to save the victim while possibly jeopardizing the prosecution of the kidnapper and trying to balance both concerns and thereby increasing the risk to the victim's
life. These conflicting objectives present a difficult choice for police
and may make delay the most attractive alternative.
The uncertainty of the full impact on a later prosecution of actions that the officer takes to rescue the victim complicates the officer's dilemma. At stake is not simply the admissibility of
statements pressured from the suspect in order to rescue the victim,
but derivative physical evidence as well. The scope of suppression
will, of course, depend on the amount of pressure put on the suspect1 29 and the applicability of rules dealing with fruits of the poisonous tree, such as the inevitable discovery exception. 13 0 At the
point at which the police have to act, they cannot be assured that the
impact of their actions on a later prosecution will not be significant.
One of the major conclusions of the ABA Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice dealing with the urban police function was that
in order to achieve "optimum police effectiveness, the police should
be recognized as having complex and multiple tasks to perform in
addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses."' '3 1 The solution proposed by Marshall and
Graham, which forces legitimate police objectives into sharp conflict, runs counter to the ABA recommendation, and their proposal
is very unfair in what it asks of the police. Under Marshall and Graham's solution, police in a stressful situation are told that they may
"split the baby," if they wish, in order to rescue the victim. By making what would seem to be reasonable and necessary police conduct
costly in terms of a later prosecution of the kidnapper, the "solution" adds to the tension and undermines police effectiveness which
may increase the danger to the victim.
This solution also seems inconsistent with what police were told
in Miranda, where the Court was highly critical of the tactics the police were employing in the station house. 132 The majority in Quarles
consciously referred to Miranda as being concerned with "constitu129 In Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), the Court limited the poisonous fruit
doctrine in connection with Miranda violations, and it may go even further in that direction. Elstad was premised on the voluntariness of the statement obtained in violation of
Miranda. For a discussion of Elstad, see supra note 91.
130 According to Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), if the prosecution is able to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits ultimately would have been
discovered by lawful means, then the court is not required to supress the subject fruits.
131 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 10 (1980).
132 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58. For a discussion of whether Miranda should be
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tionally impermissible practices of police interrogation."' 13 3 Now,
however, police are being told that warnings and trickery may be
turned on or off as the police wish. One could not blame an officer
who had read Mirandaand now reads Marshall's solution to the public safety situation for concluding that there is a shell game going on
with respect to the source of the violation of the privilege: sometimes the privilege is violated in the station house, and sometimes
the privilege is violated only at trial.13 4 But one thing is certain
about this game: at a motion to suppress, the officer always loses.
B.

CRITICISMS OF THE POLICIES OF THE PRIVILEGE

When one looks at the policies behind the privilege, it is hard
not to conclude that the privilege leads a charmed existence. Despite sustained and powerful criticisms of policies that are sometimes vague and platitudinous,' 3 5 the privilege has continued to
expand.
Consider just a few of the critics of the privilege. In 1827, Jeremy Bentham parodied the various arguments sometimes put forward in favor of the privilege. One of the arguments Bentham
attacked was the "fox-hunter's reason,"' 136 the argument that "fairness" demands that the defendant not have to give evidence that
may incriminate himself because it would take the sport out of prosecution by making conviction too easy. Bentham also attacked "the
old woman's reason,"' 13 7 the argument that it is hard on a defendant
to be put in a situation where he may have to incriminate himself.
In the 1940's, two evidence scholars urged a cautious approach
to the privilege. Wigmore concluded a section in his treatise that
analyzed the policies offered in support of the privilege 138 with the
read as an outright condemnation of some of the tactics criticized in that opinion, see
supra note 116.

133 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
134 Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion that the policies of the privilege
are not "diminished" by the fact that public safety is a concern of the police. One of the
policies Justice Marshall specifically mentioned is the assurance that "criminal investigations will be conducted with integrity and that the judiciary will avoid the taint of official
lawlessness." Id. at 2649 (Marshall,J., dissenting). But see infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
135 The most complete overview of the policies of the privilege is found in Friendly,
supra note 36, at 679-96.
136 j. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed. 1843).
137 Id. at 452.
138 For Wigrnore, the basis for the privilege lay in the belief that "auy system of adminis-

tration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of
proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such
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following warning:
In preserving the privilege, however, we must resolve not to give it
more than its due significance. We are to respect it rationally for its
merits, not worship it blindly as a fetish. The privilege cannot be enforced without protecting crime; but that is a necessary evil inseparable from it, and not a reason for3 9its existence. We should regret the
evil not magnify it by approval.1
In the same passage Wigmore criticized the "current judicial habit"
with respect to the privilege, which is "to laud it undiscriminatingly
with false cant,"' 40 and he urged that the privilege "be kept within
limits the strictest possible." 14 1 Similarly, in 1946, Professor
Charles McCormick expressed the hope that
the courts as they become more conversant with the history of the
privilege will see that it is a survival that has outlived the context that
gave it meaning, and that its application today is not to be extended
under the influence of a vague sentimentality
but is to be kept with the
142
limits of realism and common sense.
Scholars are not the only ones concerned about the sweep of
the privilege. In 1966, just a few months before Miranda was decided, Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court expressed concern that interrogation was threatened by constitutional
developments. 14 3 In a series of lectures in early 1966,Justice Schaefer reviewed the justifications for the privilege and argued that
"[t]he chief difficulty with the privilege is that it runs counter to our
1 44
ordinary standards of morality."
In 1968, Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit wrote a
lengthy and powerful article that carefully analyzed the values and
policies that have been offered in defense of the privilege. 145 Judge
Friendly's analysis of the policies and values involved led him to
conclude that the way the Court solved the problem of custodial
interrogation in Miranda failed to give sufficient weight to "the need
of the police to get information from the person best able to furnish
it."146 Judge Friendly also proposed a constitutional amendment
evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of other sources." 8 J.
§ 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
139 Id. at 317.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

140 Id.
141 Id.

at 318.

142 McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX.
L. REV. 239, 277 (1946).
143 In Miranda, the Court referred to Justice Schaefer as "one of our country's most
distinguished jurists." 384 U.S. at 480.
144 W.V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59 (1967).
145 Friendly, supra note 36, at 679-96.
146 Id. at 724.
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aimed in part at solving some of the abuses that led to Miranda while
accommodating the need of the police and society for
14 7
information.
Whatever the merits of Miranda and the Court's decisions with
respect to the privilege in an investigative setting, Justice Marshall's
insistence that the policies of the privilege are "not diminished"
simply because police are trying to protect public safety seems incorrect. Consider, for example, the policy that sometimes is said to
be at the core of the privilege: the privilege protects a fair stateindividual balance so that the power of the state does not overwhelm the individual in a way that undercuts the adversary process. 148 This policy, vague as it is, seems far less applicable in a
rescue situation than in a routine investigative setting. In a rescue
situation where the criminal episode has not ended, it seems a bit
premature to suggest that the concerns of an adversary system of
justice should determine how the crisis at hand is to be resolved by
the authorities. More importantly, in a routine investigative setting
the balance of power heavily favors the state, but in a serious public
safety situation the balance of power may be dramatically in favor of
the suspect. In a case like Krom, for example, it is the kidnapper who
is in a position where he has tremendous leverage.
To put the position of the kidnapper in better perspective, consider the situation in a case like Krom solely from a contractual perspective. If the victim's father had signed the contractual agreement
demanded by the kidnapper, which asked for $400,000 in exchange
for the release of the victim, and the victim consequently was found
alive, surely no court in the country would enforce such a contract.
Such a contract probably is not supported by consideration because
the kidnapper has, in addition to a moral duty, a preexisting legal
49
duty to help release the victim from the harm that he engineered.1
In addition, such a contract clearly would be the product of unlawful
duress and thus unenforceable. 50
147 Id. at 721-22.

148 See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251, at 317-18 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also Friendly, supra note 36, at 693-94.
149 Under the law of contracts, the courts generally "have ruled that where a party
does or promises to do what he is already legally obligated to do or promises to refrain
from doing or refrains from doing what he is not legally privileged to do he has not
incurred a detriment." J.D. CALAMARI AND J.M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4.7 at 145 (1977).
150 Duress has been defined to include "[t]hreats of personal injury, . . . [t]hreats of
destroying, injuring, seizing land or other things, or.... [ainy other wrongful acts that
compel a person to manifest apparent consent to a transaction... or cause such fear as
to preclude him from exercising free will and judgment in entering a transaction." 13
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1603, at 661-63 (3d ed. Williston &Jaeger 1970). In United
States v. West, 607 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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The same concerns found in contract cases undercut the enforceability of any grant of immunity that might be obtained
through concern over the safety of other citizens. An example of
such problems in an immunity context is United States v. McBride,15'
where a prosecutor was forced to promise immunity to an arrested
extortionist and another accomplice to secure the suspects' cooperation in locating and disarming bombs that were alleged to have
been secreted around a refinery in order to extort fifteen million
dollars. In that case, the court struggled with the enforceability of
the immunity agreement. The court reached a shaky compromise,
concluding that although a promise to fulfill a preexisting legal duty
is not valid consideration, the defendant's relinquishment of his
rights under the privilege was valid consideration.1 52 The court
then ruled, however, that the agreement was voidable for duress because "[t]o enforce the resulting agreement simply because the
magnitude of the impact of the original extortion letter enabled McBride to adopt a cooperative and benign attitude toward officials
once he was in custody, would be to permit him and [his accom1 53
plice] to profit from their earlier criminal behavior."
McBride is an interesting example of the pressures that may
heavily favor the suspect in a rescue situation. While it is clear that
if the privilege was applicable, use immunity protecting McBride
from the use at trial of the information supplied and its fruits was all
that McBride was entitled to under the Constitution, 154 he was able
to extort a promise of transactional immunity for both himself and
another accomplice who was also in custody. t5 5 It is not surprising
that negotiation guidelines for prison hostage situations suggest
that amnesty must be a nonnegotiable item. 156 If public policy so
overwhelmingly rejects grants of immunity and the enforceability of
contracts which are entered into through a fear for the safety of
ruled that an amnesty agreement between prison officials and prisoners who had taken
hostages was void for duress, and the prisoners could be prosecuted for their actions.
151 571 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
152 Id. at 605.
153 Id. at 612. The court went on to conclude, however, that actions of the government after it had determined that all bombs had been removed amounted to ratification
of the agreement. Id. at 613.
154 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see generally C. WHITEBREAD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.04, at 261-63 (1980).
155 Certainly, the federal immunity statute was not designed for this purpose. See
United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
156 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, CORRECTION INFORMATION SERIES:
PRISON HOSTAGE SITUATIONS 13 (1983); see also J.P. NEEDHAM, NEUTRALIZATION OF
PRISON HOSTAGE SITUATIONS 12 (1977).
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others, this certainly suggests that there is something amiss with the
conclusion that the privilege is applicable in such a setting.
C.

ANOTHER LOOK AT iMIRANDA

In deciding what the role of the fifth amendment privilege
should be in a life-threatening situation like the kidnapping hypothetical, it makes sense to consider again the case that first moved
the fifth amendment into the area of police interrogation-Miranda
v. Arizona. Miranda represented a sharp departure from the prior
history of the privilege. Justices Harlan and White wrote powerful
dissenting opinions in Miranda criticizing the expansion of the fifth
amendment into the station house, a decidedly nonjudicial setting.
Justice Harlan referred to the Court's reliance on the fifth amendment as a "trompe l'oeil", and he found that the Court's opinion
"reveals no adequate basis for extending the Fifth Amendment's
privilege to the police station."' 15 7 Justice White also found that the
application of the privilege to police interrogation has "no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the
Fifth Amendment,"' 5 8 and that the Court's decision is simply "at
odds with American and English legal history."' 159
In an article entitled in part A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents, 16 0 Professor Yale Kamisar, a leading authority on the privilege,
tried to make up for the obvious historical deficiencies in the majority opinion in Miranda. While conceding that Miranda "is unquestionably a sharp departure from the recent past,"''6 Kamisar argued
that the extension of the fifth amendment in Miranda to the station
house makes sense because our modem system of criminal investigation, with its focus on professional police, is really an outgrowth
of a historical system in which magistrates did the work, including
the interrogation of suspects, that is now done by police in investigating crime. Kamisar supported his argument in part by reference
to an earlier article by Professor Edmund M. Morgan on the evolving role of police in our society:
The function which the police have assumed in interrogating an accused is exactly that of the early committing magistrates, and the opportunities for imposition and abuse are fraught with much greater
danger .... Investigation by the police is not judicial, but when it
consists of an examination of an accused, it is quite as much an official
157 384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
160 Kamisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the New *'Fifth
"Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966).
161 Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
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proceeding as the early English preliminary hearing before a magistrate, and it has none of the safeguards of a judicial proceeding. If the
historical confines of the privilege are to be broadened, this surely is
an area that needs inclusion ....162
Kamisar's analysis of the function that the privilege served prior to
the establishment of professional police forces led him to conclude
that "the application of the privilege to police interrogation can be
defended as either a logical deduction from the constitutional provi16
sion or a practical condition upon its successful operation."'
Notice that Professor Kamisar's defense of the Court's decision
in Miranda regarding police interrogation is a functional one. His
argument suggests that now that police are performing the investigative function previously handled by magistrates, the privilege
should apply to the police in that capacity. Unfortunately, even Professor Kamisar, who made a strong case for the extension of the fifth
amendment to police investigative questioning, seems to have lost
sight of the fact that his argument in defense of Mirandais premised
upon police functioning in a traditional investigative capacity.
Kamisar's argument says nothing about the application of the privilege when police are performing a task that judges do not perform,
namely, when police act in a peacekeeping capacity aimed at restoring order and preventing the loss of life. Consider, however, his
comments about police questioning in a lifesaving context from another article:
It seems to me, as it did to Professor Kenneth Graham a dozen years
ago, that so long as the police conduct is likely to elicit incriminating
statements and thus endanger the privilege, it is police "interrogation" regardless of its primary purpose or motivation, and that if it otherwise
qualifies as "interrogation," it does not become something else because the

interrogator's main purpose is the saving of a life rather than the procuring of incriminating statements,
even though self-incrimination
16 4
may be seen as a windfall.

Professor Kamisar is certainly correct that interrogation is interrogation just as a rose is a rose, but he is wrong when he assumes
that all government questioning to obtain information that happens
to be incriminating must be treated the same for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination. His starting point that all police
conduct that is likely to elicit incriminating statements endangers
"the privilege," besides begging the question, constitutes an ex162 Id. at 69 (quoting Morgan, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV.

1, 27-28 (1949)).
163 Kamisar, supra note 160, at 81.

164 Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When
Does It Matter?, 67 GEO.L. J. 1, 9 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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treme view of the privilege: the privilege is designed to be an absolute protection of incriminating information in any and all contexts.
Unfortunately, this view which determines the scope of the fifth
amendment by ignoring the purpose and function of police conduct,
16 5
was adopted by the Court in Innis.
One sees reasoning similar to Kamisar's in many places. Recall
the Mesa case where a panel from the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit split three ways but reversed the suppression of the statements that a barricaded gunman made to a hostage negotiator who
was trying to talk the gunman into a peaceful surrender but failed to
precede such efforts with Miranda warnings. 166 Echoing the dissenting opinion in Mesa, 167 a Note in the Yale Law Journal criticized the
ruling in Mesa because "the same concerns" that motivated the
Court in Miranda were present in this armed encounter between the
gunman and the negotiator; thus, warnings were required by the
logic of that case. 168 The Note stressed, for example, that the negotiation technique of professing friendship in Mesa is exactly the sort
of interrogation technique the Court was concerned with in Miranda
because it might "tend to discourage suspects from invoking their
16 9
right against self-incrimination."'
The suggestion that "the same concerns" that motivated the
Court in Miranda are present in Mesa is shocking in the sterility of its
analysis. It is true that Mirandawas concerned with a defendant who
was not free to go and that Mesa involved a surrounded gunman
who was not free to go. It also is true that Miranda raised serious
questions about various interrogation techniques, such as false assurances of friendship, and that similar techniques are included in
training manuals for hostage negotiators. It also is true that being
confronted by the guns of a team of sharpshooters can be even
-more frightening and intimidating than the station house atmosphere which concerned the Court in Miranda. But these comparisons simply point to the folly of approaching the scope of the fifth
amendment solely from the defendant's point of view while totally
ignoring the threat to the lives of others and the purpose and function of the police conduct.
165
166
167
168
169

446 U.S. 291 (1979). See also supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Note, Standoff Situations and the Fifth Amendment, 91 YALE LJ. 344 (1981).
Id. at 351.
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MORE LIMITED VIEW OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A MODEL TO CONSIDER: PEOPLE K KROMI

Critics of the argument that the fifth amendment privilege is
not applicable to a crisis situation like the kidnapping hypothetical
face the initial problem, emphasized by both the majority opinion in
Quarles170 and the dissenting opinion ofJustice Marshall,1 7 1 that the
exceptions under the fourth amendment, such as that permitting a
police search in exigent circumstances, have no analogy under the
fifth amendment because the fourth amendment is phrased in terms
of reasonableness, while the fifth amendment is absolute in its
phrasing and permits no exceptions, even if reasonable. 7 2 In
Quarles, the Court finessed the problem by concluding that even if
reasonable exceptions are not permitted to the fifth amendment, exceptions to the "judicially imposed strictures of Miranda" are permissible in limited circumstances.17 3 The relevant issue is not,
however, whether fifth amendment rules permit exceptions in emergency situations, but whether the fifth amendment is meant to apply
in circumstances where the police are functioning in a situation
which is primarily noninvestigative and where life is at stake.
An opinion that emphasizes the distinction between police
functioning in an investigative capacity and police functioning in an
emergency setting where life is at stake is People v. Krom,' 74 a case
mentioned earlier for its powerful facts.' 75 Krom is a model for the
sort of analysis that ought to be used in considering the scope of the
privilege in a life-threatening situation. Krom involved a suspect in
custody who repeatedly insisted on both immunity and money
before he would lead the authorities to the kidnapping victim. At
one point in the discussions with police, Krom requested a specific
attorney, and that attorney came to the station but left after he failed
to reach a fee agreement with Krom. Krom then waived his right to
counsel and eventually led the police to the victim. The victim,
whom Krom had placed in a coffin-like box, had suffocated by the
time the police arrived. The police then brought Krom back to the
station where he gave a complete confession.
Prior to trial, Krom sought to suppress the statements and
170 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3.

171 Id. at 2648 n.10 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
172 Both opinions cite as authority Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976),
where the Court, in dicta, stated that "the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the
Fourth's, are not removed by showing reasonableness."
173 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3.
174 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 139.
175 See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
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other information that he initially had provided the police after he
initially requested counsel. Krom relied on the New York Constitution, which the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted to bar
further questioning of a suspect in custody in the absence of counsel
once the suspect has requested counsel. 17 6 In Krom, the New York
Court of Appeals drew a sharp distinction between the questioning
that had taken place before the victim's body had been found and
the questioning that had taken place at the station after the death of
the victim had become known. The difference the court observed
was in the function the police were performing. A "primary goal" of
the police, the court found, is "to prevent crime and provide emergency assistance to those whose lives may be in danger." 1 7 7 Once a
crime has been committed, however, police perform their "secondary role of attempting to apprehend the person responsible, and
1 78
gathering sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction."
The requirement of counsel is a limitation on the "investigative
techniques available to the police."' 79 If the same restriction were
imposed "where the police are engaged in their primary duty of attempting to provide assistance to a person whose life is, or may be,
in danger, there is the additional risk that delay or frustration of the
investigation may result in death or injury of the victim."'18 0 To
hold that the special restrictions of the state right to counsel extend
to where police are trying to save a life would "either dangerously
limit the power of the police to find and possibly rescue the victim
or would, perversely, permit the kidnapper to continue his ransom
demands and negotiations from the sanctuary of the police
176 People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980).
At the time Cunningham was decided, the position of the United States Supreme Court
on this suppression issue was uncertain. The uncertainty about the Court's position

resulted from its narrow holding in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosley,
the Court upheld the admissibility of a custodial statement that Mosley gave to a second
detective after he had declined to answer questions about a separate crime for a different
detective. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), however, the Court held that
once a suspect in custody invokes his right to counsel, he must not be subject to further
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless he himself initiates
further exchanges with the police.
The Court of Appeals in Krom found that the Edwards' standard had been satisfied,
presumably because the court felt that Krom had initiated further discussion with the
police. 61 N.Y.2d at 197, 461 N.E.2d at 280, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The New York rule,
however, is broader than Edwards because it mandates the presence of counsel at any
further questioning and does not allow an uncounseled waiver of that right. Id.
177 Id. at 198, 461 N.E.2d at 281, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
178 Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.
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station."181

Based on the above reasoning, the court ruled that the conduct
of the police in continuing to question the suspect in an attempt to
find the victim did not violate the state right to counsel, but that
once the victim had been found, further questioning "could only
82
serve to provide evidence for use against the defendant at trial."'
Thus, the defendant should not have been questioned after the victim's body was discovered. Nevertheless, given all the other evidence against Krom at trial, the court concluded that the admission
of the statement obtained after the victim's body was discovered was
83
a harmless error.'
Although Krom is only a state constitutional decision involving
the right to counsel, its analysis suggests a way to make sense of the
privilege against self-incrimination in a rescue situation. The privilege is designed to set up a balance in an investigative setting between the suspect and the state. The privilege and its attendant
rules, however, should not control in a crisis situation where the primary purpose of the state conduct is to prevent a tragedy from
occurring.
In the standoff situation in Mesa, 184 one of the members of the
divided panel that upheld the admissibility of incriminating statements made by the gunman to the negotiator reached a conclusion
along the lines that have been suggested in this article. Judge Adams concluded that because the agent's "prime motivation was to
achieve a peaceful resolution of the confrontation" and because the
18 5
conversation was "nonadversarial and noninquisitive in nature,"'
the exchange between the gunman and the negotiator did not constitute a fifth amendment interrogation. Adams admitted, however,
that because the agent "had a secondary purpose of gathering possible evidence" against Mesa, the interrogation issue was "an ex18 6
tremely close one."'
The problem with this analysis is that it is inconsistent with the
Court's sweeping view of fifth amendment interrogation in Innis
which asks only whether the questions were "reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response," independent of the officer's motivation in seeking the information. Thus, applying Innis to the kidnapping hypothetical, the question asking where the victim is being
181
182
183

Id. at 200, 461 N.E.2d at 282, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
Id.
Id. at 200-01, 461 N.E.2d at 282-83, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46.

184
185

See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
638 F.2d at 589-90 (Adams, J., concurring).

186

Id. (Adams, J., concurring).
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held is fifth amendment "interrogation" regardless of the fact that
the officer's dominant and overriding objective is securing the victim's safety and well-being.
Yet one of the oddities of Innis is that despite its broad conception of fifth amendment interrogation, the Court was very careful to
exclude by fiat from its definition of interrogation questioning by
the police that is "normally attendant to arrest and custody." 1 8 7 By
that language, the Court was sanctioning the long line of cases that
have held that the privilege is inapplicable to routine questioning
during the booking and administrative processing of an arrested
suspect. 8 8 Those cases make it clear that despite the fact that no
Miranda warnings have been given (or the arrestee previously has
asserted his right to remain silent) and despite the fact that the pressure of obtaining bail may necessitate the arrestee's cooperation in
providing such information, information obtained in the booking
process is not protected by the privilege. In United States ex rel. Hines
v. LaVallee,1 89 the leading case on booking information, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that "[d]espite the
breadth of the language in Miranda, the Supreme Court was concemed with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data for
booking .... "190 In Hines, the defendant's response to a booking
question about his family status turned out to be very incriminating
For a discussion of the Innis test, see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 840 (1977); United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); People v. Dalton, 91111. 2d 22,434 N.E.2d 1127
(1972). But see Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
During oral argument in Quarles,Justice O'Connor specifically mentioned the line of
booking cases when counsel for Quarles argued that, despite the public location of the
arrest, officers should have administered warnings to Quarles prior to any questioning.
Justice O'Connor asked, "What about booking questions? Some of those questions,
such as name and address, can be incriminating depending on the crime and what the
police need to know. However, we have found such questions to be proper." The attorney for Quarles responded that "[tihose questions are not like the 'where is your gun'
inquiry." 34 Grim. L. Rptr. 4182 (1984).
189 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
190 Id. at 1113. See also Varner v. State, 418 So. 2d 961, 962 (Ala. Grim. App. 1982)
(booking questions are "'non-investigative' questions not designed to investigate
crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or others in crimes"); State v.
Simoneau, 402 A.2d 870, 873 (Me. 1979) ("brief neutral questions which are not part of
an effort to elicit a confession or admission do not constitute 'interrogation' ").
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraigument Procedure, which
includes provisions dealing with the conditions that must be met prior to questioning a
suspect in custody, also states that it is concerned in such provisions only with investigative questioning. In other words, the Code only focuses on "questioning designed to
investigate crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or others in crimes."
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(5) (1975).
187
188
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because his response that he had been married for eleven years and
had two children was exactly what the robber-rapist had told the
victim.
In other cases, courts have held that booking questions aimed
192 age 93
at determining the defendant's name or alias, 9 1 address,
and other similar information 9 4 need not be preceded by Miranda
warnings. While sometimes courts bolster their reasoning by referring to the questions being asked as "neutral"' 9 5 or "routine,"' 196
there is no such thing as neutral information in the abstract. In a
19 7
particular case, one's age can supply an element of the offense,
one's address can lead to the discovery of evidence' 98 or to powerful
impeachment evidence,' 9 9 one's medical condition can be incriminating in a drug case 20 0 and, as Hines shows, even one's family status
can be powerfully incriminating in a given case.
Innis impliedly rejects the reasoning of Hines, which makes the
inapplicability of the privilege turn on the noninvestigative purpose
for which the information was sought. Thus, it was necessary for the
Court in Innis to carve out an exception for booking information in
the middle of its new test for fifth amendment interrogation. It is
certainly a strange set of priorities that would exclude from the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination a demand for an
arrestee's address for booking purposes, but would put within the
protection of the privilege a request for the same information from
an arrestee in an attempt to rescue the victim.
B.

THE PRIVILEGE IN OTHER NONINVESTIGATIVE SETTINGS

The kidnapping hypothetical can be viewed as part of the
Court's continuing struggle to make sense of the privilege against
191 See United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840
(1977); State v. Landrum, 112 Ariz. 555, 544 P.2d 664 (1976).
192 See State v. Cozad, 113 Ariz. 437, 556 P.2d 312 (1976); Mills v. Maryland, 278 Md.

262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976).
193 See People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968); Pulliam
v. State, 264 Ind. 381, 345 N.E.2d 229 (1976).
194 See State v. Rasmussen, 92 Idaho 731, 736, 449 P.2d 837, 842 (1969) (fact that
defendant gave his occupation as "pimp" during booking admissible).
195 Simoneau, 402 A.2d at 873.

196 Pulliam, 264 Ind. at 387, 345 N.E.2d at 236; Grimes v. State, 44 Md. App. 580, 586,
409 A.2d 767, 771 (1980); State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. Super. 350, 352, 379 A.2d
860, 861 (1977).
197 See Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448; Pulliam, 264 Ind. 381, 345
N.E.2d 229.
198 See Toohey v. United States, 404 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1968); Cunningham, 153 N.J.
Super. 350, 379 A.2d 860.
199 See Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1967).
200 See State v. Mitchell, 421 So. 2d 851 (La. 1981).
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self-incrimination in settings that are primarily noninvestigative.
The best examples of this struggle are the opinions of the Court
dealing with the privilege in connection with self-reporting statutes.
In 1927 in United States v. Sullivan, 20 1 for example, the Court
refused to get into the question of how one can be compelled, consistent with the privilege, to provide the amount of one's taxable
income from illegal sources on a tax return by simply asserting that
"[i]t would be an extreme if not extravagant application of the Fifth
Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the
amount of his income because it had been made in crime." 20 2 But
the claim that a large amount of unexplained income may be
20 3
powerfully incriminating is not extreme or extravagant at all.
Another example of the Court's struggle with the privilege in
connection with self-reporting statutes is Californiav. Byers,20 4 where
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that required a
driver involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his name
and address. Byers claimed that he could not be prosecuted for violating the statute because the information would have been incriminating in his situation. The California Supreme Court agreed and,
to save the statute, inserted a guarantee of "use immunity" to protect those who complied with the statute from the use in a criminal
205
prosecution of the information supplied or its fruits.
The four-person plurality began its opinion with a finding that
the statute did not present a substantial risk of self-incrimination
because most drivers who complied would risk no criminal prosecution. 20 6 The problem with this conclusion, even assuming the
Court's empirical assertion is correct, is that the risk of incrimination for purposes of the privilege is always an individual determination, and here Byers did run the risk of criminal prosecution. The
201 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
202 Id. at 263-64.

203 A response "tends to incriminate" if it might provide a clue that leads investigators to discover facts that could constitute links in a chain of circumstantial evidence
proving criminal conduct. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). The
burden of proof is heavily in favor of the person invoking the privilege. The Court has
found that a response may not be compelled unless it is " 'perfectly clear, from a careful
consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that
the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate." Id. at 488 (quoting
Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881) (emphasis omitted)). According to
the definition of an incriminating answer in Hoffman, it is apparent that a large amount of
unexplained income on a tax return certainly may be an important link in the chain of
evidence leading to conviction.
204 402 U.S 424 (1971) (plurality opinion).
205 Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969),
vacated, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
206 402 U.S. at 430 (plurality opinion).

602

WILLIAM T. PIZZI

[Vol. 76

plurality then found that the information required was not really incriminating because requiring one to stop is not testimonial, and the
disclosure of one's name and address is "an essentially neutral
act." 20 7 It would be hard not to agree with the five members of the
Court who replied that in the situation facing Byers, stopping and
providing information hardly would be "neutral"; for all practical
purposes, it would be an admission of identity for the criminal
2 08
prosecution.
The most interesting opinion in Byers is that of Justice Harlan,
the swing vote in the case, who argued that the privilege is meant to
be absolute when the governmental purpose is the enforcement of
the criminal law, but it allows a balancing of interests when other
important governmental interests are at stake. 20 9 In this situation,
given the California legislature's concern about establishing a system of fiscal responsibility for automobile accidents, Justice Harlan
concluded that the statute did not violate the privilege, even though
210
the information that must be supplied was incriminating.
Justice Harlan's view of the privilege as absolute when the governmental purpose is the enforcement of criminal law but as allowing a balancing of interests when information is sought for other
important governmental purposes is consistent with the view of the
privilege that has been argued in this article. Although the positions
are consistent, it is important to emphasize that the need for an exception to the privilege in the kidnapping hypothetical and other
rescue situations seems much more compelling than in the self-reporting cases. In the self-reporting cases, use immunity is a viable
option, even if it may be costly in terms of the effect on criminal
432 (plurality opinion).
Despite its lack of a consistent rationale, Byers is the authority on which reporting
statutes consistently are upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 638 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (upholding reporting requirement of Bank
Secrecy Act dealing with transporting currency outside country); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (upholding reporting
requirements of the securities laws); Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930 (Colo.
1985) (upholding recordkeeping and reporting requirements by purchaser of valuable
personal property).
209 402 U.S. at 440 (Harlan, J., concurring). There are hints of a balancing approach
in the plurality opinion as well. Commenting on the variety of self-reporting statutes in
our society, the plurality opinion concedes that information in such reports could be "a
link in the chain" of evidence leading to conviction. Nevertheless, the plurality opinion
also finds that "under our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to
defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here." Id. at 427-28 (plurality opinion). The plurality, however, avoids the need
to use a balancing approach by concluding that the response called for by the subject
statute was not incriminating.
210 Id. at 444-48 (Harlan, J., concurring).
207 Id. at
208
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prosecution in some situations. In a rescue situation, however, use
immunity from use of potentially incriminating information needed
to rescue the person at peril, which is designed to protect those who
have put a person at risk and who would seem to have both a moral
and legal obligation to remove the threat, seems much more questionable from both a practical and moral point of view than use immunity in a self-reporting case.
VI.

DUE PROCESS AND THE RESCUE SITUATION

The reason the Court felt compelled to announce an exception
to the requirement of Miranda warnings in Quarles was its concern
that in a situation threatening public safety, suspects "might well be
deterred from responding" 2 1 1 if warnings were administered. In response to this concem, Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that what
the Court really was doing was sanctioning the exploitation of the
coercive atmosphere that follows custodial arrest in order to force
the suspect to answer the questions asked. In that case, Justice Marshall argued that "[i]t would strain credulity to contend that Officer
Kraft's questioning of respondent was not coercive." 2 12 Justice
Marshall pointed out that the suspect was handcuffed and was surrounded in an empty store by four armed officers, one of whose first
words were: "Where is the gun?"
The majority in Quarles tiptoed by this issue. The Court noted
that no issue of compulsion had been raised below. 213 This observation, however, is a bit misleading because the lower courts excluded
the subject statement on Miranda grounds and never reached the
voluntariness issue. The Court then avoided resolving the issue by
pointing out in a footnote that Quarles "is certainly free on remand
to argue that his statement was coerced under traditional due pro2 14
cess standards."
Voluntariness often appears to be a determination that lies in
the eye of the beholder. Recall United States v. Mesa,2 15 discussed
earlier, where a trained hostage negotiator obtained incriminating
statements from a gunman surrounded by police in a motel room
over a three-hour period. The negotiator used his training to build
a relationship of trust with the suicidal gunman and eventually was
able to effect a surrender without violence. The two judges whose
opinions controlled the result in Mesa both concluded that the state211 104 S. Ct. at 2632.

212 Id. at 2647 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 2631.
214 Id. n.5.
215 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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ments of Mesa were voluntary. 2 16 One judge emphasized that because Mesa was not in the physical control of the officers and the
officers had no power to handcuff Mesa or otherwise force him to
listen to their questioning, the statements were voluntary. 2 17 In
contrast, one just as easily could fasten on other factors, such as the
length of the discussion, the techniques used and the instability of
the distraught and suicidal suspect, to argue that the statements
were involuntary. 2 18 It was precisely this sort of confusion over
"voluntariness" that the Court hoped to avoid by its opinion in Miranda, an opinion which, the Court recently declared, "creates a presumption of compulsion" 219 if no warnings are given. After Quarles,
however, it appears that "voluntariness" will remain the sort of
doubtful inquiry that will be necessary in situations like Mesa or the
kidnapping hypothetical, and one suspects that the concept of "voluntariness" will be stretched near to the breaking point to preserve
admissibility.
The problem with many of these decisions again lies in treating
incriminating statements elicited in a rescue or emergency situation
as a species of confessions that are to be measured by the standards
and procedures surrounding confessions. It would be a mistake to
follow the majority's proscription in Quarles and mechanically apply
the "traditional due process standards" to incriminating information elicited in a situation like the kidnapping hypothetical. The
standards of due process must be different when the circumstances
that led to the statement are so radically different from those of a
traditional police investigation. Consider, for example, the hornbook rule that a confession that is the result of a promise violates
due process and is inadmissible against a defendant. 220 Suppose the
police in Krom 22 1 had promised the kidnapper the $400,000 that was
demanded because they believed it was the only way to assure the
216 ChiefJudge Seitz's opinion emphasizes his conclusion that the statements police
obtained from Mesa in the course of the negotiations were voluntary. In addition, he
indicated that if the statements were not voluntary, he would reach a different conclusion on their admissibility. 638 F.2d at 589. Judge Adams also stressed that Mesa's
statements "were made of his own volition," and he characterized the exchange between
Mesa and the F.B.I. agent as "voluntary revelations made by an admittedly troubled
person ... to a compassionate listener." Id. at 590 (Adams, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 588-89.
218 It has been suggested that Mesa could have made a valid due process argument on
the facts of his situation. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Micn. L. REV. 865,
878 n.58 (1981).
219 Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292.
220 This rule goes back to Braun v.United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). See
also Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1968); People v.Jiminez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580
P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
221 See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
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victim's rescue. Or suppose, as in United States v. McBride,2 22 the police promised an extortionist in custody immunity in order to locate
bombs that they feared would cause extensive damage and injury.
Are the due process rights of the suspects violated because police
obtained incriminating information by such promises?
There are, of course, strong reasons to resist the use of false
promises or promises the police know to be unenforceable in negotiating with a kidnapper or extortionist, whether the suspect is in
custody or not. 22 3 One reason is that such promises may seriously
jeopardize the credibility of the police in the future. Nevertheless,
the suggestion that such promises violate suspects' due process
rights in such circumstances seems wide of the mark. Assuming the
statements are reliable, there is no reason to bar the admissibility of
such statements even if they would be involuntary under "traditional due process standards."
The reason why due process is not violated in these examples
even though the same conduct in an investigative setting would not
be appropriate is that due process is evaluated pursuant to a balancing test. Scholars often explain due process as having two distinct
objectives: one is a concern for the fairness of the procedures used
to convict a defendant and the other is an insistence that the state
treat the defendant in a way that respects his dignity as an individual.2 24 The first objective, which is the same type of institutional
and procedural fairness that lies at the heart of the privilege against
self-incrimination, 2 2 5 is inapplicable in a rescue situation for the
same reason that the policies of the privilege are inapplicable: investigative limits designed to protect the suspect in the station
house by insuring that the equality crucial to the adversary trial is
not undercut during the interrogation process are inappropriate in
an emergency situation where police have the object of protecting
222 See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.

223 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
224 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due ProcessAdjudication-A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319 (1966).
225 In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), the Court explained that a conviction based on an involuntary confession violates due process
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which
the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may
not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.

Id. at 540-41. This language was echoed later in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1965), where the Court, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964), held that comment on the failure of a defendant to testify at trial violated the
fifth amendment because such comment is a "remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of
criminal justice' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws."
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the lives of third persons when they are dealing with a suspect. In
such a situation, police may have little choice but to put psychological pressure on the gunman or kidnapper in order to rescue the
victim.
The second objective, that the state treat its citizens in a way
that is consistent with their individual dignity, 226 is also a balance.
When life is at stake, conduct is appropriate that would not be permitted in a different setting. It would seem offensive to our notion
of fairness for police to wear down a suspect over a period of hours
in order to obtain a confession, 227 but a trained hostage negotiator
may have to talk to the gunman for hours to secure the safe release
of the hostages. 22 8 It should not make a difference whether or not
the suspected kidnapper is surrounded by police or happens to be in
custody as long as the direct threat to innocent lives remains. Obviously, there are limits on the conduct of the police in their treatment
of suspects even in an emergency situation where life is at stake. In
determining those limits, however, the traditional scope of police
conduct permitted in a purely investigative context is only a starting
point.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Given the historical and philosophical uncertainties that have
always surrounded the privilege against self-incrimination, it is perhaps understandable that the Court in Quarles felt more comfortable
making an exception to the rules that surround the privilege rather
than examining and questioning the premise that says that the privilege controls police conduct, even when the police are dealing with
a situation posing a danger to others. But Quarles, as this article has
tried to show, does not solve the privilege problem in rescue situations. It answers only the Miranda warnings issue, and it raises a
number of other issues that also beg for "public safety" exceptions
to earlier Court pronouncements.
More importantly, at a time when studies have urged an appreciation of the complexity and multiplicity of police functions, the
Court seems to view the function of the police as primarily the in226 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
227 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
228 In Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 461 N.E.2d 276, 473 N.Y.S.2d 139, the dialogue with the
kidnapper began in the morning and continued until the kidnapper led the police to the
victim later that evening. For a discussion of Krom, see supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
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vestigation of crime and the enforcement of criminal law. 22 :1 The

Court's narrow perspective seriously underestimates the importance
of other objectives of police conduct, and it leads the Court to a
conception of fifth amendment interrogation that is too broad. The
Court's sweeping view of fifth amendment interrogation is unable to
accommodate other interests, like the concern for a victim's safety in
the rescue situation.
In arguing about the scope of the privilege, one has to accept
that there is no such thing as a knockout punch in fifth amendment
analysis. Indeed, it is quite the opposite: despite powerful criticisms and urgings of caution, the privilege has a strong momentum
for expansion. 230 The privilege is flexible enough in wording and in
history that it can be interpreted as an absolute protection from
state inquiry, even where the information sought is needed to save a
life. It also can be interpreted to mean that in any and all contexts,
even in life-threatening emergencies, the state must "shoulder the
whole load." But such an interpretation seems unfair and distorted
in the way it treats those who are at risk.

229 This misperception of police is quite graphic in Quarles where the Court insisted
that the conduct of police in arresting an armed suspect requires "spontaneity rather
than adherence to a police manual." 104 S. Ct. at 2632. In the Court's eyes, the mythical police manual is a compendium of investigative rules such as .Miranda that does not
cover the protection of public safety in effecting the arrest of an armed gunman, a fairly
common police task.
230 It has been argued that the solution to the fifth amendment problem in a standoff
situation where a surrounded gunman has taken hostages is for the Court simply to rule
as a constitutional matter that all conversations in such circumstances are per se inadmissible. This approach, it is argued, would protect the defendant's constitutional
rights and remove any temptation by police to give Miranda warnings which might
threaten loss of life in such a situation. See Note, supra note 168, at 356-62.

